Published annually, the Congressional Monitor summarizes a selection of bills and resolutions pertinent to Palestine, Israel, or the broader Arab-Israeli conflict that were introduced during the previous session of Congress. The Monitor identifies major legislative themes related to the Palestine issue as well as initiators of specific legislation, their priorities, the range of their concerns, and their attitudes toward regional actors. It is part of a wider project of the Institute for Palestine Studies that includes a comprehensive database at congressionalmonitor.org. The database contains all relevant legislation from 2001 to the present (the 107th through the 115th Congresses) and is updated on an ongoing basis. Material in this compilation is drawn from congress.gov, the official government record of all congressional legislation.
MAJOR TRENDS
During the campaign leading up to the presidential election in 2016, then-candidate Trump repeatedly pledged to broker the "ultimate deal" between Israel and the Palestinians, move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and generally strengthen U.S.-Israeli ties. These promises galvanized pro-Israel lawmakers and led to a spate of legislation endorsing Trump's views and rejecting positions taken by his predecessor. However, the 160 measures under consideration still generally fell into two of the same broad thematic categories this monitor has used in recent years: (1) those directly or indirectly benefiting Israel, and (2) those serving Israel's interests.
BENEFITING ISRAEL
Slightly fewer than a third of the measures under consideration (52) featured language designed to benefit Israel, a similar proportion to that in previous years. The 32 binding measures and 20 nonbinding measures can be further subdivided into the following categories:
Maintaining or Increasing Military Support: 18 bills introduced during the current session carried provisions authorizing or appropriating military aid to Israel. These were so-called perennial appropriations and authorizations bills, and included measures authorizing joint U.S.-Israeli research on anti-tunnel technology (H.R. 2914 of 6/15/17), additional funds for Israeli missile defense programs (H.R. 2062 of 4/6/17), and other one-off supplemental military aid. The only measures in this category that passed into law were the 6 aforementioned appropriations and authorizations bills. They authorized and appropriated spending on joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs, anti-tunneling work, and general military programs.
Providing Ceremonial or Nonmilitary Support: Eleven bills and 12 nonbinding resolutions were introduced with provisions indirectly benefiting Israel. Nine of these would have strengthened the U.S.-Israel relationship through joint scientific research or joint efforts on other ostensibly nonmilitary issues, 8 called for Trump to fulfill his pledge to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem or ordered the move, and 6 weighed in on the prospect of a two-state solution, justifying their respective policy goals in "defense" of Israel. None of these passed.
Commemorating Jewish and Israeli History: Only 1 of the 7 nonbinding measures introduced to honor aspects of Jewish and Israeli history passed. It commemorated the 50-year anniversary of Jerusalem's so-called reunification from a messianic perspective (see *S. Res. 176 of 5/24/17).
UNDERMINING ISRAEL'S ADVERSARIES
Bolstered by Trump's bellicose campaign rhetoric and his promise to strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship, in the first session of the 115th Congress lawmakers ramped up their collective efforts to undermine Israel's adversaries. Nearly three-quarters of all the measures considered in this monitor, or 118, carried such provisions, marking a significant increase in the relative proportion over the previous 2 sessions, at respectively 56.7% and 60% (see congressionalmonitor.org for full reports on the first and second sessions of the 114th Congress).
Iran
With the Republican majority largely in agreement on the 7/14/15 nuclear agreement with Iran, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and with Trump leading the campaign against the deal (see ), the number of Iran-centric pieces of legislation introduced this session decreased. From a total of 66 Iran-related measures introduced, this session saw 2 major ones passed into law: the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (*H.R. 3364 of 7/24/17), which included the text of 2 other new sanctions bills (S. 722 of 3/23/17 and H.R. 1644 of 3/21/17), and the Iran Ballistic Missile Reporting Act of 2017 (H.R. 3078 of 6/27/17), which passed into law as a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (*H.R. 2810 of 6/7/17). Overall, the 51 bills and joint resolutions and 15 nonbinding measures largely fell into following categories:
Sanctions: The lion's share of the measures would have either imposed new sanctions, strengthened existing sanctions, or facilitated the future application of further sanctions on Iran. Of the 29 bills and joint resolutions in this category, only the aforementioned Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act passed into law. But both before and after that, lawmakers introduced a slew of measures directing the president to impose new restrictions on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC; e.g., S. 67 of 1/9/17), as well as purported money laundering activities by the Iranian leadership (e.g., H.R. 1638 of 3/20/17), and the Tehran government's alleged use of commercial planes for military purposes (e.g., H.R. 566 of 1/13/17).
Human Rights and Prisoners: The 10 resolutions in this category either condemned Iranian human rights abuses, called for the release of political prisoners, specifically U.S. citizens being held in Iran, or both. Only two of these passed, both calling for the "unconditional" release of U.S. prisoners in Iran (*H. Res. 317 of 5/4/17 and *S. Res. 245 of 8/3/17) . The three bills in this category were introduced in direct response to then-president Barack Obama's $1.7 b. payment to the Iranian government in 1/2016, which coincided with Iran's release of 4 U.S. prisoners, and prompted speculation in Congress about a secret diplomatic arrangement (see S. 386 of 2/15/17 for details). None of the measures passed.
Countering Iranian Influence: While many of the measures carrying provisions targeting Iran included some mention of Iran's deployment of "proxies" in the Syrian civil war and across the Middle East, only 5 bills were designed explicitly to counter such activities. None of them passed. Also in this category, 3 resolutions encouraged the Argentine government to continue to investigate the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires and the death of special prosecutor Alberto Nisman in 1/2015 (Nisman was found dead hours before he was set to defend his claim that then-president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner had covered up Iran's alleged involvement in the 1994 AMIA bombing). One of these resolutions passed (*H. Res. 54 of 1/23/17).
Palestinians
There were a few signs that the bipartisan consensus on Palestinians was changing this session.
Notably, Rep. Betty McCollum (D-MN) introduced the Promoting Human Rights by Ending Israeli
Military Detention of Palestinian Children Act (H.R. 4391) on 11/14/17, and was able to sign on 19 cosponsors by the end of the session. The bill, which would have imposed restrictions on U.S. aid to Israel in connection with its maltreatment of Palestinian minors, marked the first truly significant piece of legislation in recent memory to uphold Palestinian human rights. Aside from McCollum's initiative, the legislative output in the first session of the 115th Congress was indistinguishable from that in previous sessions. Of the 21 measures carrying relevant provisions, 15 were bills or joint resolutions that either maintained restrictions on U.S. economic aid to the Palestinians or imposed new, harsher restrictions (e.g., H.R. 1164 of 2/16/17). No new restrictions passed into law.
There were also four bills directly targeting Palestinian institutions, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO; S. 1757 of 8/3/17 and S. 2192 of 12/5/17), Hamas (H.R. 3542 of 7/28/17), and both Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine (PIJ; H.R. 2712 of 5/25/17). The remaining measure in this category condemned Palestinian leaders for allegedly inciting violence against Israelis (H. Res. 68 of 1/27/17). None of these measures passed.
The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement
Although there were fewer anti-BDS measures under discussion this session, the issue was just as prominent as in previous years in the broader debate around the U.S. relationship with Israel. Down from 9 and 14 in the first and second sessions of the 114th Congress, respectively, there were only 7 new anti-BDS measures introduced in the first session of the 115th Congress, and none of them passed into law.
The Israel Anti-Boycott Act, which would have levied new restrictions and punishments on BDS-friendly companies and their affiliates, sparked the greatest controversy (see S. 720 of 3/23/17), with Palestinian solidarity activists, the American Civil Liberties Union, and other civil rights groups leading a campaign against the bill. Their efforts resulted in convincing one senator, Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), to formally stop cosponsoring the bill, which abruptly suspended its otherwise expedited passage through the legislative process.
United Nations
Over the years, Israel's allies in Congress have secured numerous restrictions on the United Nations (UN) and various UN agencies and programs for their alleged bias against Israel. This year saw an expansion of those efforts, specifically in response to former president Obama's decision not to veto UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2334 censuring Israel's settlement enterprise on 12/23/16 (see JPS 46 [3] ). Ten bills and 5 resolutions carried provisions responding directly to the UN measure, and 1 of them passed (*H. Res. 11 of 1/3/17). Apart from those 15 initiatives, there were an additional 4 bills and 5 resolutions with provisions responding to other UN actions on Israel, targeting UN agencies, or otherwise adjusting the U.S. stance toward the UN.
In a related development, lawmakers introduced four bills to buttress U.S. efforts against international anti-Semitism. These measures would have elevated to the status of ambassador the special envoy to monitor and combat anti-Semitism (S. 1292 of 6/6/17 and H.R. 1911 of 4/5/17) and introduced a new reporting requirement related to anti-Semitism in Europe (H.R. 672 of 1/24/17 and S. 198 of 1/24/17).
Hizballah
Many of the measures discussed above related Israel's security to Iran's regional influence, and cited Hizballah as a "threat" to Israel. In addition, there were 6 measures carrying provisions explicitly targeting Hizballah. The only nonbinding measure in this category, a simple resolution urging the European Union to designate the group a terrorist organization (*H. Res. 359 of 5/25/17), passed on 10/25/17. The same day the House passed that resolution, it passed two other measures targeting Hizballah: The Sanctioning Hizballah's Illicit Use of Civilians as Defenseless Shields Act (H.R. 3342 of 7/20/17) and the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2017 (H.R. 3329 of 7/20/17). Neither of these bills, nor any of the other Hizballah-specific legislation, passed into law.
UNDERSTANDING THE CONGRESSIONAL MONITOR
Measures are listed in the order in which they are first introduced, with a brief title provided after the date. The second line of each entry provides the bill or resolution number, the name and affiliation of the original sponsor, and the number of cosponsors.
For many measures, a "see also" entry has been added to refer readers to similar, identical, or related bills and resolutions.
The "last major action" entry indicates where the measure stood at the end of the first session of the 115th Congress.
Because of the large number of measures that were introduced this session, and also due to space limitations, summaries are only provided for the large authorizations and appropriations bills that passed into law. In-depth summaries of all bills and resolutions are available at congressionalmonitor.org. 
NOTES ON LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE
For a bill to become a law, it must be agreed to in identical form by both chambers of Congress and signed by the president. The president may refuse to sign a bill, and thus veto it, but the veto can be overturned by a two-thirds majority vote in each chamber. If Congress is not in session, the president can veto a bill simply by not taking action on it for 10 days after its presentation ("pocket veto"). Simple or concurrent resolutions have no legal force when passed. Simple resolutions (designated H./S. Res.) are only debated in the chamber where they are introduced while concurrent resolutions (H./S. Con. Res.) are debated in both; resolutions require a simple majority to pass. After a bill or resolution is introduced, it is automatically referred to the appropriate committee; in many cases (76 of 160 this year), it goes no further. This bill stipulates that the U.S. president must recognize Jerusalem as an "undivided" city, that every Israeli citizen should have the right to reside anywhere in Jerusalem, and that the president should implement the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 and move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
The bill would also freeze 50% of the funding appropriated in FY 2017 for security, construction, and maintenance at all U.S. embassies until the U.S. embassy in Israel opened in Jerusalem. If the embassy in Jerusalem was not opened by 10/1/17, all FY 2017 funding for all U.S. embassy security, construction, and maintenance would be entirely eliminated, except at the U.S. embassy in Israel. In another provision carried over from previous years, no funding for the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is allowed unless the secretary of state can determine and report to Congress that the UNHRC is taking steps to remove Israel as a permanent agenda item and that U.S. participation in the UNHRC is of national interest. Furthermore, the secretary of state is required to report to Congress on the resolutions considered at the UNHRC over the previous year and on any action that is taken to remove Israel from the agenda.
Funding for the PA and Programs in the West Bank and Gaza
As in previous years, funds are authorized to support the Palestinian Authority (PA) as well as programs serving Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (known as Economic Support Fund or ESF), but no specific funding totals are provided. Prior to FY 2015, the State Department's budget requests were generally granted in full; however, only $290 m. and $205.517 m. were ultimately spent on these programs in FY 2015 and FY 2016, respectively, marking a significant reduction from the $370 m. requested every year. The extent of funding for these programs is therefore again unclear for FY 2017.
The State Department requested $327.6 m. in ESF for programs in the West Bank and Gaza, to "preserve the viability of a negotiated, two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by working with the [PA] to build the institutions of a future Palestinian state to deliver services to the Palestinian people." The department requested an additional $35 m. from the broader request for international narcotics control and law enforcement (INL) funds to "continue to build the capacity of the [PA] security sector and sustain the capabilities of the PA security forces."
Prior to disbursement of any ESF, the secretary of state is required to report to Congress that the purpose of the transfer is to either "advance Middle East peace," "improve security in the region," "continue support for transparent and accountable government institutions," "promote a private sector economy," or "address urgent humanitarian needs."
In a recurring provision, all ESF transfers to these programs are to be suspended if the Palestinians initiate or support an International Criminal Court-authorized investigation into alleged Israeli war crimes or if the Palestinians achieve the standing of a member state at the UN or any agency thereof outside a negotiated settlement with Israel. The secretary of state is permitted a national security waiver of this restriction, so long as he reports to Congress on how the waiver would "assist in furthering Middle East peace." Furthermore, ESF to the Palestinians is to be deducted by an amount equal to that paid out by the PA, the PLO, or any successor organizations to Palestinians imprisoned by Israel and to the families of Palestinians killed while committing acts of armed resistance in the previous calendar year.
As in previous years, the president is authorized to waive the ban on a PLO office in the United States if he certifies to Congress that the Palestinians have not obtained member state status or equivalent standing at the UN or in any UN body, and that they have not "taken any action . . . intended to influence a determination by the ICC to initiate a judicially authorized investigation" into alleged Israeli war crimes against Palestinians. If the president is unable to make these certifications, he is still permitted a waiver if he can certify that the Palestinians have entered into "direct and meaningful" negotiations with Israel.
Finally, the secretary of state is required to submit 2 reports to Congress: the first, about assistance provided to the PA Security Forces (PASF), including "detailed descriptions" of training, curriculum, and equipment provided; an assessment of the PASF before and after training; a description of the assistance provided to the PASF by other countries; and a description of any modifications to the PA's security strategy; and second, new this year, detailing any "steps taken by the PA to counter incitement of violence against Israelis and to promote peace and coexistence with Israel."
Military Assistance to Egypt
In keeping with practice in recent years, the secretary of state must certify that the Egyptian government is "sustaining the strategic relations with the United States" and "meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty" in order for any ESF or FMF to be released to Egypt. Of the $112.5 m. appropriated in ESF to Egypt (down from $150 m. in FY 2016), no less than $35 m. is made available for higher education programs and no less than $10 m. is set aside for scholarships to financially needy students. The secretary of state is directed to withhold ESF in an amount equivalent to the bail money expended by the United States and on legal and court fees by NGOs in connection with so-called democracy-related trials in Egypt (as in previous years, the secretary would be able to annul this provision by certifying to Congress that Egypt had dismissed the 6/4/13 convictions of 16 U.S. citizens on charges related to using foreign funds to destabilize the government). Furthermore, 15% of the Egypt's FMF would be held until the secretary certifies that the Egyptian government is taking "effective" steps to advance democracy and human rights in Egypt; implementing reforms protecting freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly; releasing political prisoners and providing detainees with due process of law; holding Egyptian security forces accountable; and providing regular access for U.S. officials to monitor such assistance in areas where it is used. The secretary is permitted a national security waiver on the FMF restriction so long as he reports to Congress on which requirements cannot be met. He is also directed to take all "practicable steps" to ensure monitoring and oversight mechanisms are in place and to report to Congress on any plan to restructure military assistance for Egypt.
The ESF appropriation listed above is available for the creation or operation of 1 or more "enterprise funds" for Egypt (see *H.R. 2029 of 4/24/15 at congressionalmonitor.org for background on enterprise funds). An unspecified amount of ESF is made available for loan guarantees to Egypt.
Finally, Egypt is authorized to lease certain military materials from U.S. commercial suppliers if the president determines that there are "compelling foreign policy or national security reasons" to do so.
Oversight and Policy on Iran
Unspecified funds are made available to support: the U.S. policy to "prevent Iran from achieving the capability to produce or otherwise obtain a nuclear weapon"; an "expeditious" response to any violation of the 7/14/15 JCPOA or UNSC Resolution 2231, which codified it; the implementation and enforcement of sanctions on Iran related to terrorism, human rights abuses, ballistic missiles, and weapons proliferation. Funds are made available for so-called democracy programs in Iran.
In terms of congressional oversight, the secretary of state is required to continue filing biannual reports to Congress on Iran's compliance with the 7/14/15 JCPOA, submit a report on the status of U.S. and multilateral sanctions on Iran, report on the transfer of $1.7 m. to Iran that was announced on 1/17/16 (see S. 3117 of 6/29/16 at congressionalmonitor.org for details on that requirement), and inform the relevant congressional committees of any new information on the agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency at the time of the 7/14/15 nuclear deal.
As in FY 2016, an unspecified amount of the $50.5 m. appropriated for promoting "internet freedom globally" is made available for such activities in Iran.
Military and Economic Support for Jordan
No less than $1.27995 b. is made available to Jordan across a variety of funding categories, including $475 m. in direct budget support for the Jordanian government (up from $204 m. in FY 2016). In addition, an unspecified amount is made available to implement the Jordan Compact Action Plan and the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016-18, and up to $500 m. is made available for the Jordanian government to enhance security along its borders.
An unspecified amount of ESF is made available for loan guarantees to Jordan.
Responding to the Crisis in Syria and Iraq
This bill contains numerous provisions designed to counter the threat posed by ISIS in Syria and Iraq or to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Syria, by supporting specific Syrian and Iraqi armed groups, so long as they adhere to a U.S. conditions, an approach unchanged from previous years. To advance U.S. goals, $1.61 b. is made available for the Counter-ISIL Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund and another $980 m. to provide "training; equipment; logistics support, supplies, and services; stipends; infrastructure repair and renovation; and sustainment" to certain vetted Syrian rebel groups, so long as they are committed to fighting ISIS, they have no connection with Iran or designated terrorist groups, and that they respect "human rights and the rule of law." The secretary of defense is required to notify Congress 15 days prior to any transfer of funds under these provisions. New this year, the abovementioned $980 m. comes from the newly created Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund. Similar funding in previous years' legislation came from separate "train and equip funds" for groups in Syria and Iraq.
As in FY 2016, ESF, FMF, INL, and funds appropriated to peacekeeping operations support the provision of nonlethal assistance to certain vetted programs whose purpose is to establish representative, inclusive, and accountable government in Syria; develop and implement democratic, transparent, and lawful political processes; further develop the Syrian opposition; develop civil society and an independent mass media; promote stability and economic development; document, investigate, and prosecute human rights violations; expand the role of women in negotiations to end the violence and in any political transition; assist Syrian refugees complete education requirements at regional academic institutions; assist "vulnerable populations" in Syria and neighboring countries; and counter extremism. New this year, such funds are also made available to political and economic programs that empower women, protect and preserve the cultural identity of the people of Syria as a counterbalance to extremism, and protect and preserve cultural heritage sites in Syria. Furthermore, such funds are also made available "to continue a program to strengthen the capability of Syrian civil society organizations to address the immediate and long-term needs of the Syrian people inside Syria." Additional funds are available under the act for explosive ordnance disposal programs in areas "liberated from extremist organizations" and for general assistance in areas liberated from ISIS.
Said funds are made available only after the secretary of state submits an update on the comprehensive U.S. strategy for Syria and "takes all practicable steps" to ensure that monitoring and oversight procedures are in place.
In another provision carried over from previous years, the Defense Department is barred from entering into contracts of any kind with Rosoboronexport-the Russian state intermediary agency for the import and export of arms-unless the secretary of defense can certify that to do so is in the interest of national security or if Rosoboronexport has, inter alia, ceased transferring arms to the Syrian government.
Assistance to Lebanon
As in the previous two years, an unspecified amount of FMF is made available to Lebanon "to professionalize the [Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)] and to strengthen border security and combat terrorism, including training and equipping the LAF to secure Lebanon's borders, interdicting arms shipments, preventing the use of Lebanon as a safe haven for terrorist groups, and to implement [UNSC] Resolution 1701" which called for a full cessation of hostilities after Israel launched the July 2006 war on Lebanon (also known as the second Lebanon war), inter alia. Further FMF, as well as an unspecified amount of INL, is made available "to address security and stability requirements in areas affected by the conflict in Syria" with programs and equipment specifically destined to the LAF and Lebanon's Internal Security Forces (LISF). None of these funds remain available if the LAF is controlled by a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, and they can only be transferred once the secretary of state submits a spending plan to Congress, including a proposal for actions to be taken if the funds are misused. An unspecified amount of ESF to Lebanon is also included in the legislation.
Although State Department requests for Lebanon have not always been a good indicator of how much money is ultimately transferred, they are worth looking into for the spending rationale they convey. The State Department requested $110 m. in ESF to support "Lebanese institutions that advance internal and regional stability, combat the influence of extremists, and promote transparency and economic growth," and $105 m. in FMF to help the LAF maintain Lebanon's borders and national territory against "extremist threats, including [ISIS] and al-Nusra." Finally, the department requested $10 m. in INL to help the LISF "become more responsive to the public's internal security needs" and to "enhanc[e] the ability of Lebanon's criminal justice institutions to work together to provide effective criminal justice and internal security services to the public."
Funding and Restrictions on Relevant Government Entities and International Programs/Agencies
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA): Although neither the bill nor its explanatory materials include any specific appropriation to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), U.S. funding for UNRWA typically comes out of the appropriation to the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund ($2.15 b. and $40 m., respectively). U.S. contributions to UNRWA averaged $382.9 m. per year in FY 2014-16, and a similar amount is expected in FY 2017. As in previous years, the secretary of state must certify, prior to the disbursal of any funds, that the agency is using its local officers to inspect agency installations and report on any inappropriate use; "taking steps to ensure" the content of all its education materials are consistent with values of human rights, dignity, and tolerance, as well as being free from incitement; avoiding financial institutions and other entities that would put the agency in conflict with U.S. law; and complying with the UN's biennial audit requirements.
Reconciliation Programs: As in FY 2016, no less than $26 m. is made available to support "people-to-people" reconciliation programs in areas of civil strife and war around the world. Unlike last year, there is no specific appropriation designated for programs in the Middle East.
International Peacekeeping Activities: Down from $2.12 b. in FY 2015 and $1.8 b. in FY 2016, $1.35 b. is made available for contributions to these activities. Specific activities and agencies are not listed in the bill, but the State Department requested $149 m. for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and $14.05 m. for the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) operating on the Syria-Israel border, which is operating at a reduced force level of 800, down from 1,250, due to "force protection measures."
Complex Crises Fund: Matching the $30 m. appropriation in FY 2016, $30 m. is earmarked for this program, which has been used to address instability caused by political transitions in the Middle East. In its budget request, the State Department noted that "these funds will target countries that demonstrate a high or escalating risk of conflict, instability, or atrocities."
Center for Middle Eastern-Western Dialogue (The Hollings Center for International Dialogue): Interest and earnings accrued by the center's trust fund are made available. The bill's explanatory materials give no specific figure, unlike in previous years.
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG): $722 m. is made available for the BBG to carry out "international communication activities, and to make and supervise grants for radio and television broadcasting to the Middle East." The BBG is directed to notify Congress within 15 days if any of its broadcast entities are providing an open platform for designated terrorist groups.
Prohibition against Direct Funding for Certain Countries: As in previous years, loans, credits, insurance, and guarantees to the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Syria are banned.
Coups d'État: Unless the secretary of state can certify that a democratically elected government has subsequently taken power, all assistance would be cut off to any country whose head of government is deposed by military overthrow. This provision does not apply to programs promoting "democratic elections or public participation in the democratic process."
Notification Requirements: No funds may be appropriated to select countries (including Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen) outside regular appropriations committee notification procedures.
Arab League Boycott of Israel: Expressing Congress's opposition to the boycott, this provision encourages the Arab League to normalize relations with Israel, calls on the U.S. president and secretary of state to help end the boycott, and urges the president to report to Congress annually on steps taken to do so.
Palestinian Statehood: No support is permitted for the establishment of a Palestinian state unless the secretary of state certifies that certain conditions are met, including the ability of the "governing entity" to demonstrate a commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel and to the pursuit of "counterterrorism" measures in the West Bank and Gaza. Under the legislation, the PA or the governing entity of a new Palestinian state is required to terminate all claims of "belligerency," to respect the "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area through the establishment of demilitarized zones and other measures, and is working toward establishing a framework to settle the refugee question." The president is permitted a national security waiver on this provision.
Business with the PA in Jerusalem: No funds appropriated in this bill may be spent on a diplomatic mission of any kind in Jerusalem, except for the U.S. consulate, to conduct business with the PA or any successor government.
Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC): Funding of the PBC is prohibited. Assistance for the West Bank and Gaza: Prior to the disbursal of any ESF to programs in the West Bank or Gaza, the secretary of state must certify that none of the money goes to any person or group that participates in or advocates for "acts of terrorism" and that all grantees are thoroughly vetted. These provisions are subject to audit and investigation, for which up to $500,000 are appropriated to USAID. Furthermore, no U.S. aid is available for "the purpose of recognizing or otherwise honoring individuals who commit or have committed acts of terrorism" and no funds appropriated for security assistance in the West Bank and Gaza are made available until the secretary of state reports to Congress that the Palestinians comply with certain benchmarks.
Limits on Aid to the PA: Barring a presidential national security waiver, aid to the PA is restricted and conditional. If the president exercises the waiver, the secretary of state would have to certify that the PA establishes a single treasury account through which to channel aid, establishes a comprehensive civil service roster and payroll, is working to counter violence against Israelis, and is supporting activities promoting peaceful coexistence.
Prohibition of Assistance to the PLO and Hamas: Aid transfers in support of the PLO are barred. No funds are permitted to help pay the salaries of PA employees in Gaza or to support Hamas, any power-sharing government of which Hamas is a member, any government resulting from an agreement with Hamas, or one in which Hamas exercises "undue influence." The president may waive this restriction if he can certify that all ministers in such a power-sharing arrangement have publicly accepted and complied with two principles: recognition of the "Jewish state of Israel's right to exist" and acceptance of previous bilateral agreements. If the president exercises the waiver, the secretary of state would have to submit to Congress a quarterly report on the power-sharing government guaranteeing that all its ministers are continuing to uphold the aforesaid principles. If the president cannot provide said certification, aid may still be disbursed, but only to specific agencies and programs, including the office of the PA president.
Last major action: 5/5/17 became public law (5/4/17 resolving differences-Senate agreed to House amendments, 79-18; 5/3/17 resolving differences-House agreed to Senate draft, with amendment, 309-118; 3/21/17 passed in Senate by unanimous consent; 2/13/17 passed in House by yea/nay vote, 409-1). Introduced amid a spate of legislation responding to the passage of UNSC Resolution 2334, this bill states that nothing in Resolution 2334 would impact U.S. law. Furthermore, it would redefine "Israel" under U.S. law to include any area over which the Israeli government "exercises civil jurisdiction," including East Jerusalem, both Area C and Area H2 of the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. It also states that nothing in any UNSC resolution pertaining to Israel may be used to establish any violation of U.S. law, even in the presence of legal standing, a cause of action, or source of damages.
Last major action: 1/4/17 referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Designed to counter perceived anti-Israeli sentiment and anti-Semitism at the UN, this bill would institute a series of measures leveraging U.S. funding to effect change within various UN agencies and bodies. First, it would suspend all U.S. support for the UN until the president can certify that no UN agency or body grants official status or otherwise recognizes any organization that promotes or condones anti-Semitism. Second, it would suspend the portion of U.S. funding that would go to the UNHRC until the secretary of state can certify that the UNHRC no longer includes a permanent agenda item on Israel or the occupied Palestinian territories. Third, it would suspend U.S. support for UNRWA until the secretary can certify that no UNRWA employee in the West Bank or Gaza is a member of Hamas or has propagated anti-Israel or anti-Semitic material, no UNRWA facility is being used by Hamas, UNRWA is subject to "comprehensive financial audits," and no recipient of UNRWA funds is a member of Hamas. Fourth, it would require the president to direct the U.S. special representative to the UN to lobby for all UN employees to publicly condemn anti-Semitism; to enforce existing regulations on anti-Semitism, including appropriate punishments; and to propose the establishment of mechanisms to keep UN employees and member states accountable, inter alia.
It also includes a few new oversight mechanisms. The Office of Management and Budget would be directed to submit an annual report to Congress on U.S. assistance provided to countries "actively seeking to implement" UNSC Resolution 2334. Further reports would be required on the amount of U.S. assistance received by countries that habitually vote for UN resolutions deemed to be antiIsraeli, and on all UN activities, publications, websites, textbooks, or actions deemed to be antiIsraeli or anti-Semitic.
Last 
Congressional Monitor
This bill would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit aid to the PA and the PLO until the secretary of state certified to Congress that the PA, PLO, and all subsidiary or affiliated organizations had ceased payments to the families of Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces purportedly in the course of "conspiring to commit an act of terrorism" or committing such an act. The secretary would have to recertify every 6 months to lift the suspension. If the secretary was unable to make the certification, all funds appropriated as aid to the PA would be redirected to support Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system. Last major action: 2/1/17 referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Condemning the PA for "joining the ICC" and resorting to the court to initiate legal actions against Israel, this resolution states that "lawfare" is threat to U.S. military activities abroad and to U.S. allies, such as Israel.
Last major action: 2/7/17 referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
FEBRUARY 2017: EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO AUTHORIZE CASH FLOW FINANCING TO EGYPT AND EXPAND OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION
H. Res. 113, Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), 1 cosponsor. Reaffirming the U.S.-Egypt alliance and the need for U.S.-backed loan guarantees to Egypt, this resolution called for an increase in U.S. economic aid to that country, the reinstatement of cash flow financing to Egypt in 2018 and afterward, and the expansion of the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) program.
Congress authorized funds to be disbursed for the establishment of the first QIZ in Jordan in 1997 purportedly to facilitate economic growth and stability in the Middle East. There were 4 designated QIZ's in Egypt at the time this bill was introduced.
Last major action: 2/10/17 referred to House Subcommittee on Trade.
FEBRUARY 2017: TAYLOR FORCE ACT
H.R. 1164, Doug Lamborn (R-CO), 169 cosponsors. This bill would prohibit certain aid to the West Bank and Gaza under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Aid "that directly benefits the PA" would be suspended until the secretary of state could certify that the PA, PLO, and any affiliated organizations were "taking credible steps" to end acts of violence against U.S. and Israeli citizens in the West Bank, ending monthly payments to the perpetrators of such attacks and their families, and dismantling any system for compensating imprisoned Palestinians that uses the individual's sentence to determine the amount of compensation allotted. If the secretary was unable to make this certification, he would be required to report to Congress on the reasons why and the total amount of aid withheld. H.R. 1221, Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE), 1 cosponsor. This bill would urge the president to establish, with Israel and the PA, an international fund for Israeli-Palestinian peace "to promote and support contact, cooperation, dialogue, shared community building, peaceful coexistence, joint economic development, and reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians." It would also authorize $50 m. in U.S. contributions to the fund and require the president to report annually on such contributions as well as on the fund's operations, and any "insights gleaned" from the "people-to-people" relationships facilitated thereby.
Last major action: 2/27/17 referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
FEBRUARY 2017: A BILL TO CONDITION ASSISTANCE TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ON STEPS BY THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY TO END VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAELI CITIZENS

S. 474, Lindsey Graham (R-SC), 19 cosponsors.
Like the House's version of the Taylor Force Act (H.R. 1164 of 2/16/17), this bill would prohibit certain aid to the West Bank and Gaza until the secretary of state could certify that the PA has ended its monthly payments to the perpetrators of acts of violence against Israeli citizens in areas under its control and was "taking steps" to end such acts. The one difference: this version would not require the secretary of state to certify that the PA was publicly condemning such acts to lift the hold on aid.
See also: S. 1697 of 8/1/17. The bill would also require the Export-Import Bank to consider policies and actions intended to penalize or otherwise limit relations with Israel when evaluating potential credit applications.
Although the bill's "Definitions" section stated that "nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the established policy of the United States or to establish new U.S. policy concerning final status issues associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict, including border delineation," critics alleged that the measure would effectively apply anti-BDS initiatives targeting both Israel as well as Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories.
On 7/17, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published an open letter in which they urged members of the House and Senate to oppose this bill as "antithetical to free speech protections enshrined in the First Amendment." The following day, the liberal Zionist lobby group J Street came out against the bill, despite the group's traditional opposition to BDS. J Street's criticisms sparked a wave of debate resulting in other progressive groups and lawmakers voicing opposition to the bill (see JPS 47 [1]). As a result, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) formally withdrew her cosponsorship on 8/1. This bill states it would elevate the status of the U.S. special envoy to monitor and combat antiSemitism to the rank of ambassador, direct the envoy to report directly to the secretary of state, and prevent the envoy from being saddled with an additional, unrelated portfolio of issues.
See also: identical bill S. 1292 of 6/6/17. Last major action: 5/18/17 referred to House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations. This bill would increase U.S. pressure on Iran by requiring the president to determine whether any of the Iranian entities freed from U.S. sanctions in the context of the 7/14/15 nuclear deal have knowingly facilitated a significant transaction or provided significant financial services to a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) or any entity currently under U.S. sanctions related to terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the export of certain goods to Syria, the government of Syria in general, or Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, inter alia.
Last major action: 4/27/17 referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
APRIL 2017: PROMOTING EQUALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS ACT OF 2017
H.R. 2232, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), 23 cosponsors. Through a variety of measures, this bill would condition or otherwise limit U.S. contributions to "promote reform" and limit the UN's alleged "anti-Semitism and anti-Israel bias." As written, the bill specifically targets 3 major UN agencies-UNRWA, UNHRC, and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR)-and codifies a new set of conditions for U.S. support to a potential future Palestinian state.
Regarding UNRWA, the bill would withhold U.S. contributions until the secretary of state certified that no UNRWA employee or affiliate was a member of a designated foreign terrorist organization; used UNRWA resources to disseminate political materials; or propagated anti-U.S., anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or propaganda. The secretary would also have to certify that no UNRWA facility was being used by such organizations; UNRWA was subject to comprehensive financial audits; no UNRWA school used textbooks that include anti-U.S., antiIsrael, or anti-Semitic rhetoric; no recipient of UNRWA funds was a member of a designated FTO; and UNRWA held no assets with financial institutions deemed by the United States to be complicit in money laundering and financial terrorism. While the abovementioned certifications were active, U.S. contributions to UNRWA would be further limited to 22% of the agency's total budget that year or the highest amount contributed to the agency by a member of the Arab League, whichever was lower.
In a related, yet nonbinding provision, the bill would request that the president urge other countries to suspend their contributions to UNRWA until the agency fulfilled the conditions listed above, and responsibility for Palestinian refugees be transferred to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Regarding the other two agencies, U.S. contributions to UNHRC and UNHCR would be suspended until the secretary of state certified that U.S. participation in the UNHRC was in the U.S. national interest; that the UNHRC had removed Israel and human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories as permanent agenda items; the UNHRC did not include any member states subject to UNSC sanctions, or one under UNSC investigation for human rights abuses; and the percentage of U.S. citizens employed at the senior level in each of the UNHCR's major divisions was at least equal to the percentage of total U.S. contributions to the UN's overall budget. The secretary would also have to report to Congress on the status of these conditions within 90 days of the bill's passage into law. Finally, the bill would establish as U.S. policy to pursue the repeal of the UNHRC resolution, adopted 3/24/16, allowing for the creation of a "blacklist" of businesses that operate in Israeli settlements.
The bill would further block the United States from appointing any official as a representative to a UN agency that has granted full membership to "any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood" (Palestine being one) and establish a policy of opposing any UN entity or agency's recognition of a Palestinian state outside a negotiated peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
Last major action: 4/28/17 referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs. S. 1060, Ted Cruz (R-TX), no cosponsors. Introduced the day after President Trump met with PA president Abbas at the White House, this bill would strengthen restrictions on U.S. aid to the Palestinians. Specifically, it would bar the PLO from operating an office in the U.S. unless the president certified to Congress that the Palestinians had negotiated a peace agreement with Israel and "ceased hostilities" against it, had not obtained standing as a UN member state outside a negotiated settlement with Israel, had ceased to be members of the ICC, had stopped official government (PA) payments to individuals found to have committed serious crimes against Israelis or their families, ceased to "engage in a pattern of incitement against or with respect to" the United States or Israel, and had withdrawn or terminated any examination or investigation against Israel or Israeli nationals at the ICC. This bill would suspend all U.S. contributions to the UN until the president made a slew of certifications pertaining to the UN's fairness and funding sources. Even if the president was able to make all the requisite certifications, the United States would not be able to provide more than 18% of the UN's total budget and 25% of UN peacekeeping operations.
Although none of the required certifications directly related to Israel, the bill included a section of "findings" that included a criticism of the "constant and disproportionate use of UN time and money to harass Israel."
Last major action: 5/17/17 referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
MAY 2017: END SUBSIDIZING PALESTINIAN TERRORISM ACT
H.R. 2497, Trent Franks (R-AZ), no cosponsors. This bill would impose additional conditions on U.S. aid to the Palestinians. Specifically, it would bar all support for the PA and assistance for the West Bank and Gaza until the secretary of state certified that the PA was "taking credible steps to end terrorist acts against U.S. and Israeli citizens perpetrated by individuals under its jurisdictional control," had "publicly condemned" such acts, and had ended its practice of paying monthly stipends to Palestinians convicted of serious crimes against Israelis or U.S. citizens or the families of Palestinians killed while committing such acts.
MAY 2017: EXPRESSING THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO A TWO-STATE SOLUTION BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
H. Res. 331, Trent Franks (R-AZ), no cosponsors. This resolution resolved that it should be U.S. policy to oppose a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict "if either party refuses to recognize the other party's right to exist." Furthermore, the resolution urged the Trump administration to require any PA or PLO officials seeking U.S. support for peace efforts to "fully recognize" the Oslo Accords as the basis for any peace talks and to acknowledge Israel's right to exist and its historic land claims.
Last major action: 6/27/17 referred to House Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. H.R. 2712, Brian Mast (R-FL), 27 cosponsors. This bill would impose new sanctions on foreign persons, groups, and governments that allegedly support PIJ, Hamas, or their affiliates. Specifically, it would require the president to report to Congress a list of persons, agencies, and governments that assist, provide transactions for, or participate in the abovementioned groups, and then impose sanctions on each listed entity. The president would be required to effect a one-year suspension on all U.S. assistance to any foreign government listed, inter alia, with exceptions allowed either on national security grounds or for any entities that no longer participate in the abovementioned activities.
The president would also be required to report whether each government listed was taking "adequate measures" to freeze Hamas and PIJ assets and, if not, assess the reasons for not doing so, listing the steps taken by the U.S. to encourage them to do so. This report would also have to include assessments for countries in which Hamas and PIJ do significant fund-raising, financing, or money laundering.
Last major action: 11/15/17 after markup, ordered to be amended by voice vote. 
Israeli Missile Defense
This bill authorizes up to $92 m. for Israel to procure Tamir interceptors for the Iron Dome missile defense system, so long as any disbursements comported with the 3/5/14 U.S.-Israeli memorandum of understanding on the Iron Dome program (see JPS 43 [4] ). It also authorizes up to $120 m. for the David's Sling weapons system and $120 m. for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program, providing that the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment could certify that Israel has reached certain technical milestones related to these programs, Israel is matching U.S. investment in these programs on a one-to-one basis, and the United States has entered into a coproduction agreement with Israel, inter alia. The undersecretary is allowed to waive this certification requirement if Israel demonstrates that U.S. support for these programs would only be used for the "procurement of long-lead components and critical hardware in accordance with a production plan," that such components fulfill certain technical benchmarks, and that such procurement would maximize coproduction in the United States. 
Managing Relations with Iran
Amending U.S. law requiring an annual report on the military power of Iran, this bill requires the secretaries of defense and state, in consultation with the director of national intelligence, to report to Congress on Iran's use of civilian transportation infrastructure for illicit activities, including the transport of weapons and soldiers via commercial passenger aircraft; an assessment of Iranian military cooperation with foreign countries, including North Korea and Syria; and an assessment of the Iranian commercial aviation sector's knowing support for the Iranian armed forces, Hamas, Hizballah, and other designated foreign terrorist organizations.
This bill also includes the full text of H.R. 3708 of 6/27/17, extending a presidential reporting requirement related to Iran's ballistic missile program through 2022.
Matters Relating to Syria
Among a slew of provisions pertaining to U.S. activities in Syria or implementing new oversight procedures, this bill extends for another year the authorization for the secretary of defense to provide assistance to counter ISIS and authorizes $1.269 b. for the effort.
The president is required to submit to Congress a report describing U.S. strategy in Syria, including key geopolitical interests and objectives, as well as effectiveness indicators to measure their realization, a description of U.S. assumptions regarding the key actors involved in the conflict, a description of how current military and diplomatic efforts adhere to the objectives mentioned above, and the resources required to achieve those objectives, inter alia. Furthermore, administration officials are required to file reports on the humanitarian crisis in Syria and on the broader U.S. strategy for Syria and Iraq.
See also: the Senate's initial draft of the NDAA S. 1519 of 7/10/17. Last major action: 12/12/17 became public law (11/16/17 conference report agreed to in Senate by voice vote; 11/14/17 conference report agreed to in House 356-70; 9/18/17 passed in Senate by yea/nay vote 89-8; 7/14/17 passed in House by yea/nay vote 344-81). Introduced in response to signature of a major arms deal with Saudi Arabia during President Trump's trip to Riyadh on 5/20/17-5/22/17, this bill would convey the sense of Congress that the president should ensure that any such deals "do not in any way adversely affect Israel's qualitative military edge," or QME, and direct him to consult with Israeli officials prior to making any determination about a potential agreement's effects on Israel's QME. It would also amend existing reporting requirements relating to Israel's QME, which are triggered by a proposed arms sale, to require an assessment of Israel's ability to defend itself from non-state actors, the risk posed to Israel if the buyer subsequently sold the weapons, and the countermeasures available to Israel to defend itself against the weapons involved in the sale.
Last major action: 6/8/17 referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
to implement the strategy, and require the secretary of state to provide annual briefings on the subject to the relevant congressional committees, inter alia. Last major action: 9/5/17 referred to House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. H.R. 3280, Tom Graves (R-GA), no cosponsors. This multifaceted bill included a variety of provisions related to financial services, including the appropriation of funds to some government institutions. Among the provisions, one would permit the federal government to request that banks terminate or otherwise restrict accounts belonging to an agency of the governments of Iran, Syria, North Korea, or any country on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. This provision originated in H.R. 2133 of 4/25/17 and later passed in the House as a part of H.R. 10 of 4/26/17.
Last major action: 7/18/17 placed on the union calendar. In terms of new measures, the president would be required to impose restrictions on any foreign entity that knowingly provided fund-raising and recruitment services to Hizballah, including al-Manar TV, and any foreign government agency that provided Hizballah financial support or other assistance. Finally, in an effort to undermine Hizballah's alleged narcotics trafficking, the president would be required to block all transactions of Hizballah-related property either in the United States or within the possession of a U.S. citizen. All these restrictions would be subject to a presidential national security waiver.
In terms of congressional oversight, the president would be required to submit a biannual report to Congress listing foreign financial institutions worth at least $10 m. and located within the jurisdiction of a state sponsor of terrorism or controlled by such organizations, an annual report detailing Hizballah's alleged racketeering activities, and a onetime report on Hizballah's alleged "illicit tobacco trafficking," inter alia. This bill came up for debate on the House floor during the first week of September as the 9/30 deadline for FY 2018 appropriations approached, and lawmakers offered more than 1,000 amendments, including many relevant to this monitor. Summarized below are the relevant amendments that were approved: H.A. 331, submitted by Matt Gaetz (R-FL) on 9/7/17, no cosponsors. This amendment would block any of the funds appropriated in the bill from being used to assist any of 34 specific Palestinian schools that are named after alleged "terrorists, killers, and Nazi collaborators," according to Gaetz on 9/7/17. The amendment was agreed to by voice vote on 9/7/17. This annual resolution sets priorities related to spending for all government programs and initiatives. Matters pertaining to the broader Arab-Israeli conflict are largely absent from the draft of the measure that was ultimately passed in both chambers of Congress, but Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) proposed four amendments during the Senate's consideration on 10/18. Each of these allow for the Senate Budget Committee to adjust its ledger related to hypothetical future legislation imposing sanctions on Iran in connection with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. None were considered by the full plenum.
Last major action: 10/26/17 House agreed to Senate amendment by yea/nay vote, 216-212 (10/19/17 agreed to in Senate with amendment; 10/5/17 passed in House by yea/nay vote, 219-206). This bill would direct the president to impose sanctions on any foreign person or entity responsible for or complicit in Hamas's alleged use of human shields, including members of Hamas. Sanctions would include prohibitions on property transactions in the United States as well as on entry into the United States. The president would be allowed to waive any sanctions in the interest of national security. Furthermore, this bill would urge the president to direct the U.S. ambassador to the UN to urge the Security Council to pass a resolution imposing multilateral sanctions pertaining to Hamas and human shields.
See also: H.R. 3342 of 7/20/17, which was essentially the same bill, but with "Hizballah" in place of "Hamas."
Last major action: 11/15/17 ordered to be reported out of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by voice vote. Specifically, it would suspend all aid to the West Bank and Gaza that "directly benefit[s] the PA" until the State Department certified that the PA "is taking credible steps to end acts of violence against Israeli citizens and U.S. citizens that are perpetrated by individuals under its jurisdictional control." The secretary would also be required to submit an annual report to Congress stipulating the amount paid by the PA to cover such stipends over the previous calendar year, as well as on a number of other activities related to the program.
In a new provision added to this draft of the bill, aid to the East Jerusalem hospital network would be exempt from these restrictions. Also in this draft, the president would not be provided a national security waiver.
The changes in this version of the bill reflect the results of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) hearing on the subject, held on 7/12, with testimony from Elliott Abrams, a former diplomat in the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations, and Daniel Shapiro, who served as U.S. ambassador to Israel under President Barack Obama. The SFRC approved the resulting draft in a 17-4 vote, with only Democrats opposing it. The White House was largely quiet on the subject of this legislation, except for a few comments from top officials voicing general support for its underlying goals.
See also: H.R. 6389 11/18/16 and S. 3414 of 9/28/16. Last major action: 9/6/17 placed on Senate calendar.
This multifaceted bill carried provisions on a variety of issues related to border security, domestic security, drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal immigration, and the visa system. In a section titled "protecting national security and public safety," there is a provision stipulating that "for purposes of this Act," any PLO official, representative, or spokesman would be viewed as someone "engaged in terrorist activity."
Last major action: 9/5/17 placed on Senate calendar under general orders.
OCTOBER 2017: MULTILATERAL AID REVIEW ACT OF 2017
S. 1928, Bob Corker (R-TN), 7 cosponsors. This bill would establish a new system for the U.S. government to review the effectiveness of its contributions to multilateral organizations, including UNRWA. This would involve the creation of a task force to review aid to multilateral organizations and a triennial report to Congress, including assessments of the effectiveness of specific contributions to specific agencies.
See also: H.R. 4502 of 11/30/17. Last major action: 11/28/17 placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under general orders.
OCTOBER 2017: NIE ON IRANIAN PROXY FORCES ACT
H.R. 4012, Bradley Scott Schneider (D-IL), 22 cosponsors. This bill would require the director of national intelligence to submit a National Intelligence Estimate report to Congress assessing Iran's support for proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon, including Hizballah, and the increased threat posed to Israel and other U.S. allies in the region as a result of that support. The director would also be required to submit a strategy for preventing Iran from expanding its influence in Syria and Lebanon.
Last major action: 10/11/17 referred to House intelligence and foreign affairs committees. This bill would authorize the president to undertake a series of measures to "ensure Israel is prepared for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon after the expiration of provisions in the [7/14/15 nuclear deal] ," and including the construction of "large ordnance systems," such as extended runways and bases for aircraft and munition storage facilities. The president would have to report to Congress the results of a joint U.S.-Israeli study on Israel's military requirements for a confrontation with Iran before implementing any of the abovementioned measures.
Last major action: 10/11/17 referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
